Abstract. Since the introduction of side-channel attacks in the nineties, RSA implementations have been a privileged target. A wide variety of countermeasures have been proposed and most of practical attacks are nowadays efficiently defeated by them. However, in a recent work published at ICICS 2010, Clavier et al. have pointed out that almost all the existing countermeasures were ineffective if the attacks are performed with a modus operandi called Horizontal. Such attacks, originally introduced by Colin Walter at CHES 2001, involve a single observation trace contrary to the classical attacks where several ones are required. To defeat Horizontal attacks, the authors of the ICICS paper have proposed a set of new countermeasures. In this paper, we introduce a general framework enabling to model both Horizontal and classical attacks (called Vertical) in a simple way. This framework enables to enlighten the similarities and the differences of those attack types. From this formalism, we show that even if Clavier et al.'s countermeasures thwart existing attacks, they do not fully solve the leakage issue. Actually, flaws are exhibited in this paper and efficient attacks are devised. We eventually propose a new countermeasure.
Introduction
Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) is a cryptanalytic technique that consisting in exploiting the side channel leakage (e.g. the power consumption, the electromagnetic emanations) produced during the execution of a cryptographic algorithm embedded on a physical device. It uses the fact that this leakage is statistically dependent on the intermediate variables that are processed. Some of these variables are sensitive in the sense that they are related to secret data, thus reaching information on them enables efficient key recovery attacks [3, 9, 15] . Since the publication of the first attacks, many papers describing either countermeasures or attack improvements have been published (see [3, 4, 16] for example). Among these improvements, higher-order SCA are of particular interest. They extend the initial concept by considering a set of several instructions instead of a single one and circumvent many countermeasures proposed in the literature (e.g. [4, 10] ). Another significant improvement has been proposed initially by Walter [19] and then studied more deeply by Clavier et al. in [5] . Essentially, it consists in a new modus operandi called Horizontal, in which sensitive information is extracted from a single measurement split into several parts. It differs from the classical Vertical mode where information is obtained from different algorithm executions. Horizontal mode applies when the same guessable sub-part of a secret is involved in many internal operations during the overall algorithm processing. This is particularly the case for RSA implementations where the exponentiation is composed of small multiplications that all depend on the same secret exponent sub-part. As noticed in [5, 19] , a striking point is that classical countermeasures (e.g. the exponent or the message blinding techniques), efficient in the Vertical context, turn out to be almost ineffective in the Horizontal one. This makes the construction of new appropriate countermeasures a real issue for the security of embedded implementations of RSA and similar algorithms. An attempt to design such countermeasures thwarting both types of attacks has been done in [5] . Actually, we show in this paper that these countermeasures (Sections 4 and 5) do not completely remove the leakage, even if they thwart some attacks. To exhibit the flaws and, eventually, to propose new countermeasures (Section 6), we first introduce a framework enabling to formally study the resistance of an implementation against side channel attacks in both Horizontal and Vertical modes (Sections 2 and 3). This framework could be used to further analyse the security of other algorithms' implementations than RSA ones. On the other hand, the countermeasure proposed in this paper is a first step towards an efficient and effective security against Horizontal attacks. The definition of alternative countermeasures is a new open avenue for further research.
A Comprehensive Study of Side-Channel Analyses
In the following, a general framework is introduced which enables to describe most of the existing attacks in a similar way and to identify their core differences (actually the leakage pre-treatment, the leakage model and the statistical test).
A General Framework for Side-Channel Analyses
Notations. A realization of a random variable X is referred to as the corresponding lower-case letter x. A sample of observations of X is denoted by (x) or by (x i ) i when an indexation is needed. In this case, the global event is sumed up as (x) ← X. The i th coordinate of a variable X (resp. x), viewed as a vector, is denoted by X[i] (resp. x[i]). As usual, the notation E[X] refers to the mean of X. For clarity reasons we sometimes use the notation E X [·] to enlighten the variable over which the mean is computed.
All the attacks below target a variable Z(k, X) defined as the output of a specific computation (e.g. a multiplication) performed by the device and parametrized by a secret sub-part k and a public variable X 1 . In the following, we shall use Z instead of Z(k, X) if there is no ambiguity on k and X.
To recover information on k, the attacks are performed on a sample of observations related to the processing of Z by the device. Each of those observations,
